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Since its emergence, the mobile advertising industry has been struggling with fraud issues 
that cause great financial losses and damage how companies relate to one another. The present 
study takes advantage of the privileged position of the researcher to explore the effects of fraud 
issues taking place in the mobile advertising industry on intercompany relationships; 
particularly, it looks at the mobile app advertising ecosystem, the focal context of Hang My 
Ads and the adaptation processes undertaken by advertisers and publishers to tackle the effects 
of fraud. 
A qualitative case study methodology was used to address the research problem. In addition 
to the collection of secondary data, semi-structured face-to-face or internet-mediated interviews 
were made.  
The mobile app advertising ecosystem is found to be organized in advertisers, 
intermediates, publishers and technology companies, and characterized by marking challenges 
such as fraud, lack of transparency and lack of regulation. Advertisers and publishers seem to 
adapt in similar ways to one another, but differences are found at the processes of service 
planning and scheduling, production, and “other” – where advertisers adapt more and seem to 
invest more resources; and at the level of organization structure – where adaptations appear to 
be related with company size. Furthermore, the case confirms the occurrence of adaptations 
taking place in the dyad and propagating to the broader network. In addition to financial losses 
and poor ROI, the reallocation of budgets according to a publisher’s competence to handle fraud 
is confirmed; moreover, it is found that damages at the levels of user experience, industry’s 
reputation and companies’ efficiency are caused by fraud. A visual scheme of the ecosystem’s 
mapping and a modified framework of analysis are proposed. 
 
KEYWORDS: business relationships; adaptation processes; mobile advertising; mobile ad fraud. 
  






Desde o seu início, a indústria da publicidade mobile tem vindo a enfrentar problemas de 
fraude associados a grandes perdas financeiras e danos na forma como as empresas se 
relacionam. O presente estudo tira partido do acesso privilegiado da investigadora para explorar 
os efeitos dos problemas de fraude nas relações entre empresas da indústria; em particular, o 
estudo aborda o ecosistema da publicidade das aplicações mobile, o contexto focal da Hang My 
Ads e os processos de adaptação levados a cabo por advertisers e publishers para lidar com os 
efeitos da fraude. 
O problema de investigação foi abordado através de uma metodologia qualitativa de caso 
de estudo. Além da recolha de dados secundários, foram conduzidas entrevistas semi-
estruturadas presenciais ou mediadas por internet. 
O ecosistema da publicidade de aplicações mobile revela organizar-se em advertisers, 
intermediários, publishers e empresas de tecnologia, e é marcado por desafios como a fraude, 
a falta de transparência e a falta de regulamentação. Advertisers e publishers parecem adaptar-
se de formas semelhantes, embora diferenças sejam detetadas nos processos de planeamento e 
agendamento do serviço, produção, e “outro” – onde advertisers adaptam mais e investem mais 
recursos; mas também ao nível de estrutura organizacional – onde as adaptações parecem estar 
relacionadas com a dimensão da empresa. Além disto, a investigação confirma a ocorrência de 
adaptações ao nível da díade, que se propagam para a rede de empresas mais alargada. Além de 
perdas financeiras e baixo ROI, a realocação de orçamentos de acordo com a competência do 
publisher para lidar com fraude é confirmada; o estudo revela ainda como efeitos da fraude 
danos aos níveis da experiência do utilizador, da reputação da indústria e da eficiência das 
empresas. Um esquema visual do mapeamento do ecosistema e um modelo de análise 
modificado são propostos. 
 
PALAVRAS-CHAVE: relacionamentos empresariais; processos de adaptação; publicidade 
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Research devoted to business relationships has been extensive over the last decades, 
exploring not only topics concerned with the nature, importance and age of intercompany 
relationships; but also the factors affecting the development and decay of those relationships; 
and their effects on the parties involved and the broader horizon of interconnected companies 
(Håkansson & Snehota, 1995).  
Business relationships are based on repeated interactions between companies (e.g. Ford, 
Gadde, Håkansson and Snehota, 2003; Håkansson and Snehota, 1995; Holmlund, 2004). Such 
interactions produce mutual orientation and commitment (Håkansson & Snehota, 1995) and 
provide the knitting of episodes that affect and are affected by the overall relationship, 
simultaneously revealing conflict and cooperation (Turnbull, Ford, & Cunningham, 1996). The 
establishment, development and maintenance of relationships with other companies become a 
complex and central marketing task (Ford, 1980) that is affected by a variety of factors such as 
past episodes, the present situation, future expectations and the wider network of relationships 
(Håkansson & Ford, 2002). Moreover, the complex dynamic of a business network reveals that 
companies cannot remain independent isolated entities, but are, instead, connected with several 
other companies within a network, be it directly or indirectly (Håkansson & Snehota, 1995; 
Håkansson & Ford, 2002). Hence, coping with change within the relationship and network 
emerges as another critical task (Håkansson & Snehota, 1995), since as well as being the means 
to address problems, interaction and change may be sources of problem generation and conflict 
between companies (Ford et al., 2008).  
Interaction can be understood through the three sub-processes of exchange, adaptation and 
coordination (Möller & Wilson, 1988), assuming the form of a continuous problem-solving 
process between companies. Adaptations are held as a necessary condition for the existence of 
partnerships (Brennan & Turnbull, 1997b) and can emerge incrementally over time (Brennan 
& Turnbull, 1997), as they stem from the need to coordinate the activities of the individuals and 
companies, by modifying and adapting products, routines and rules of conduct (Håkansson & 
Snehota, 1995). In this sense, interfirm adaptations function as elements of social exchange, 
involving trust-building and power relations (Hallén, Johanson, & Seyed-Mohamed, 1991; 
Brennan, Turnbull, & Wilson, 2003). 
The advertising industry has had swift growth since the emergence and rapid development 
of the internet. On a global scale, the advertising spending is expected to have escalated beyond 





$628 billion by the end of 2018 (eMarketer, 2018), driven by increased investments in digital 
and mobile ads. Together, digital and mobile are expected to hold 43.5% of the total advertising 
investments by the end of 2018 and near 50% by 2020 (eMarketer, 2018). Having achieved 
unprecedented growth, mobile advertising accounted for 56.7% of digital ad revenues in 2017 
(PwC, May 2018), and is forecasted to keep increasing its share to 62% in 2018 (Magna Global, 
September 2018). Meanwhile, desktop-based ad revenues will keep declining by 3.9% this year. 
(Magna Global, September 2018). 
As mobile advertising escalates, marketers are faced with great challenges. Besides from 
the many advantages brought by the internet, illegal and unethical behaviors – such as online 
frauds, thefts, violation of digital property rights and privacy issues – started to arise and create 
major challenges to the advertising industry (Kim, Jeong, Kim, & So, 2011). The threat of fraud 
to the advertising ecosystem is a growing concern to both academics and practitioners (Crussell, 
Stevens, & Chen, 2014; Zhu, Tao, Wu, Cao, Kalish & Kayne, 2017), for it results in reduced 
return on investment (ROI) for advertisers and an increased portion of wasted advertising 
budgets (Daswani, Mysen, Rao, Weis, Gharachorloo, Ghosemajumder and The Google Ad 
Traffic Quality Team, 2008). Yet, very little research has been published on the topic. 
The present study aims to deepen the theoretical and empirical knowledge on the influence 
of mobile ad fraud in intercompany relations. The research takes as theoretical delimitation the 
study of business relationships with a specific focus on their inherent adaptation processes since 
these consist of the core processes through which not only companies respond to environmental 
and market forces, but also establish long-term relationships with other companies. On the other 
hand, taking advantage of the privileged access to data by the researcher, the study assumes as 
practical limitations: the focus on the mobile app advertising ecosystem – a subsector of the 
broader mobile advertising industry, which for the scope of this study is considered as the 
ecosystem of companies related to either demand or supply of in-app and/ or app advertising; 
the issue of mobile ad fraud; and the focal network of Hang My Ads (HMA) – a mobile 
advertising company focused on app promotion. 
The overall purpose of the research is to understand how fraud in the mobile advertising 
industry affects intercompany relationships, from which the following research problem 
emerges: how do fraud issues in the mobile advertising industry affect the relationships between 
advertisers and publishers? Four research questions are selected: RQ1) Who are the different 
players within the mobile app advertising ecosystem and how can the relationships between 
them be mapped? RQ2) How do fraud issues affect the adaptation processes undertaken by 





publishers (suppliers)? RQ3) How do fraud issues affect the adaptation processes undertaken 
by advertisers (clients)? RQ4) What are the main effects of fraud within the mobile app 
advertising ecosystem? 
The relevance of combining the study of business relationships and adaptation processes 
with the mobile app advertising ecosystem (MAAE) and the phenomenon of mobile ad fraud 
relates to the lack of academic and sometimes managerial knowledge on the topic: whilst many 
researchers have dedicated studies to the comprehension of fraudulent activities within online 
advertising, very little has been written about those involved or the impact their activities have 
on advertiser-publisher relationships. As Grewal, Bart, Spann and Zubcsek (2016) note, 
marketing research must continue to push the boundaries of mobile advertising research, by 
collaborating closely with practitioners for a greater access to relevant data. By taking 
advantage of the professional position of the researcher, the opportunity to fill the theoretical 
and empirical gap presented and simultaneously provides a positive and original contribution 
to the academic community becomes exciting and, hopefully, more feasible. 
The study presented is outlined as follows: we first review prior research on the topics of 
business relationships and networks, adaptation processes, and mobile advertising and fraud; 
the next section presents the conceptual framework that guides the research; considerations of 
method are next described; further ahead, the case study and its analysis are presented; finally, 
the closing chapter highlights the major conclusions, implications for management and 
recommendations for future research arising from the research. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In the course of this literature review, a brief outline of prior research is carried out with 
regards to the major topics and concepts underlying the research. The approach to business 
relationships and networks includes a discussion on how business relationships develop and 
how interdependence between them forms business networks; research on dyadic adaptation 
processes, its classification and its measurement models is further presented. Lastly, literature 
on mobile advertising and fraud in the online advertising industry is discussed. 
2.1. Business relationships and networks 
2.1.1. Development of business relationships 
Some of the pioneer contributions to the research on business relationships have had their 
origin within the International Marketing and Purchasing (IMP) Group, but a number of other 





contributors have also helped to shape the theoretical and empirical knowledge on business-to-
business marketing and the nature of buyer-seller relationships within business markets 
(Turnbull et al., 1996). Yet, as Fonfara, Ratajczak-Mrozek and Leszczyński (2016) note, the 
IMP Group’s research stood out because of its search for explaining empirically observed 
phenomena, while challenging old economic thinking’s concepts and ideas and suggesting 
alternative frameworks. 
Although the extant literature on the subject reveals slight differences between definitions 
of business relationships, a common assumption that these are based on repeated interactions 
between the counterparts involved is evident (Holmlund, 2004). Håkansson and Snehota (1995) 
adopt a relationship view of business markets, focusing on intercompany relationships over 
time, instead of singular transactions and exchange episodes, as this seems to offer a more 
pragmatic description of the problems faced by companies. The authors take on the definition 
of relationship as a “mutually oriented interaction between two reciprocally committed parties” 
(Håkansson & Snehota, 1995, p. 25) and apply it to the intercompany context in industrial 
markets to further define it as “a result of an interaction process where connections have been 
developed between two parties that produce a mutual orientation and commitment” (Håkansson 
& Snehota, 1995, p. 26). Similarly, Ford et al. (2003, p. 38) define a business relationship as 
the “pattern of interactions and the mutual conditioning of behaviors over time, between a 
company and a customer, a supplier or another organization”. For Turnbull et al. (1996, p. 45) 
the relationship works as a “receptacle for the combined experience of the participants”, 
consisting of learned rules and norms of behavior and providing the atmosphere of episodes 
that affect and are affected by the overall relationship, simultaneously revealing conflict and 
cooperation.  
The concept of time emerges as a defining feature of business relationships and the chain 
of interactions and episodes that shape them (Ford, 1980; Ford et al., 2003; Håkansson & 
Snehota, 1995; Holmlund, 2004). By focusing on episodes taking place between companies 
over time, the authors adopt a relationship view as opposed to single exchange episodes (Ford 
et al., 2003) and capture the past and future of interdependencies (Håkansson & Snehota, 1995), 
behaviors, experiences, expectations and commitments within the relationship (Ford et al., 
2003). Seen as sequences of acts and counteracts, business relationships become simultaneously 
mutually demanding and mutually rewarding (Håkansson & Snehota, 1995). 
The complex structure and dynamics of business markets imply that companies foster the 
establishment, development, and maintenance of relationships with other companies as a central 





marketing task (Ford, 1980). Håkansson and Ford (2002), when studying actor’s reactions, 
identify five factors that impact on relationship development: 1) previous acts taking place 
within the relationship; 2) previous learnings from other relationships; 3) the current state of 
the relationship and connected relationships; 4) expectations of the parties regarding the future 
of the relationship; and 5) what is happening in the wider network of relationships. 
2.1.2. Interdependence and networks 
Exploiting the full potential of a supplier-customer relationship requires a close integration 
of both companies’ operations and, therefore, extensive interpersonal interaction, coordination 
of activities and adaptation of resources become necessary (Gadde & Snehota, 2000).  
One of the core assumptions of the IMP Group’s research is the interdependency between 
business relationships, meaning that exchange in one relationship necessarily conditions 
exchange in others and therefore one company cannot be fully autonomous (Ford et al., 2003; 
Gadde & Snehota, 2000; Håkansson & Snehota, 1995). Each relationship entails 
interdependencies between the parties involved, and at the same time reveals interdependencies 
with several other relationships, forming a network (Gadde & Snehota, 2000). The adoption of 
a network approach implies that business relationships are seen as forming part of a wider 
structure, instead of being isolated entities (Ford et al., 2003; Håkansson & Snehota, 1995; 
Möller & Halinen, 1999). Such vision offers a richer picture of the constraints and opportunities 
a company faces when dealing with its suppliers and clients (Håkansson & Snehota, 1995) and 
emphasizes all the related interactions that take place in the network between a multitude of 
connected parties (Backhaus & Büschken, 1997). 
The concept of business network takes shape as an organization without a clear center or 
clear boundaries that implies a chain effect resulting from connectedness, meaning that 
whatever happens in one business relationship propagates and affects the whole network. 
Consequently, any relationship between two companies cannot depend solely on the parties 
involved: a change in one relationship affects the state of some other relationship(s), be it 
positively or negatively; and any attempt of developing new relationships depends on the 
broader network structure (Håkansson & Snehota, 1995; Håkansson & Ford, 2002; Möller & 
Halinen, 1999). In this sense, business networks can be regarded as patterns of complex 
interactions within and between companies, taking place over time and incurring in both 
benefits and costs for the parties involved (Ford et al., 2003; Håkansson & Ford, 2002). Such 





interactions, along with adaptations and investments over time, dictate how dense the network 
is and how it is economically, technically and socially structured (Håkansson & Ford, 2002). 
2.2. Adaptation processes 
The IMP’s interaction approach has largely contributed to the research on business 
relationships (Backhaus & Büschken, 1997; Biggemann & Buttle, 2007; Håkansson, 1982; 
Håkansson & Ford, 2002; Holmlund, 2004; Medlin, 2004; Möller & Wilson, 1988; Turnbull et 
al., 1996), by placing the analytical concept of interaction at the heart of the relationship and 
network (Medlin, 2004).  
Interfirm interaction can be understood through the three sub-processes of exchange, 
adaptation, and coordination. Together, interaction processes shape the way relationships 
develop, are maintained and are terminated (Möller & Wilson, 1988). Interaction is a process 
in which ideas, solutions, technologies, problems, and interdependencies are dealt with and 
transferred across a network of companies, each taking advantage of the benefits, continuous 
change and cooperation involved, therefore working as both a dynamic and a stabilizing force 
(Ford et al., 2008). Additionally, interaction may take place as a routine, without conscious 
effort or planning, or may, in contrast, require extensive planning, development, negotiation, 
bargaining or conflict; the typical scenario is that interaction assumes the role of a more or less 
continuous problem-solving process between the parties and each dyadic interaction is affected 
to a greater or lesser extent by those with which it is connected (Ford et al., 2008). 
Within interaction processes, adaptation processes have deserved greatest prominence in 
research (e.g. Brennan & Turnbull, 1997, 1997b, 1999; Brennan et al., 2003; Fonfara et al., 
2016; Ford, 1980; Hallén et al., 1991; Schmidt, Tyler, & Brennan, 2007), since “adaptation, by 
one or both partners, is a necessary condition for the existence of a “relationship” or 
“partnership”” and “the ability of the firm to respond to environmental or market forces is a 
critical factor for survival and success” (Brennan & Turnbull, 1997b, p. 128). 
Adaptation processes represent “the extent to which the buyer and seller make substantial 
investments in the relationship” (Metcalf, Frear & Krishnan, 1992, p. 29, as cited in Baptista, 
2013) and stem from the need to coordinate the activities of individuals and companies, by 
modifying and adapting products, routines and rules of conduct, so to reflect a mutual 
commitment that both constrains and empowers companies (Håkansson & Snehota, 1995). 
Ford et al. (2003) argue that adaptations are the means by which a company shows it can 
be trusted to respond to a counterpart’s requirements and that the willingness to adapt reveals 





the company’s commitment to the development of the relationship. Interfirm adaptations are 
hypothesized by Hallén et al. (1991) as elements of a social exchange process, involving trust-
building and power relations. The same component of trust-building in mutual adaptations is 
emphasized by Brennan et al. (2003), who, supporting the findings of Hallén et al. (1991), 
distinguish between reciprocal and unilateral adaptations: while the former corresponds to a 
means of trust building, the latter emerges in research as a response to power imbalances 
(Brennan et al., 2003; Hallén et al., 1991). Adaptations often lead to the emergence of 
relationship-specific assets and thus have to be managed and controlled, in order to avoid 
uncontrolled investments (Ford, 1980). 
Schmidt et al. (2007) findings reveal that there is no difference between supplier and 
customer companies in terms of motivations to adapt, although suppliers refer to a wider variety 
of reasons to adapt. The authors justify the finding with the fact that – as other researchers have 
argued – suppliers adapt more than customers (Baptista, 2013; Brennan et al., 2003; Schmidt et 
al., 2007). The authors also find that suppliers are much more likely to adapt in large scale and 
that large-scale adaptations are a rarity in customer companies (Schmidt et al., 2007). Finally, 
their study suggests that while product or production process adaptations are more commonly 
motivated by direct operational needs, human resources and organization structure adaptations 
are usually driven by the need of building trust and commitment (Schmidt et al., 2007). 
2.2.1. Definition of dyadic adaptations 
Early research points out to the importance of adaptations, by highlighting examples and 
offering analogies (e.g. Håkansson, 1982; Hallén et al., 1991), without, however, providing a 
succinct definition of the concept. Brennan, Turnbull and Wilson (2003, p. 1939) call this lack 
of consensus problematic and suggest a definition wide enough to comprise changes by both 
parties and a broad range of activities: “dyadic adaptations are defined as behavioral or 
organizational modifications at the individual, group or corporate level, carried out by one 
organization, which are designed to meet the specific needs of one other organization”. The 
term dyadic adaptation places the focus at the level of the supplier-customer relationship, as 
opposed to some approaches to strategic marketing that emphasize the macro-environment 
(“environmental adaptation”) and the market level (“market adaptation”). Dyadic adaptations 
can be unilateral (when a firm implements a non-reciprocal specific modification for an 
exchange partner) or mutual (when reciprocal adaptation takes place to facilitate the exchange 
process) (Brennan et al., 2003). 





Dyadic relationships are influenced by relationships with other companies (Anderson et 
al., 1994) and thus adaptations and changes cannot be attributed solely to the dyad: because 
companies are socially constructed through the interaction of people within the company and 
with other companies, network effects can potentially be observed within dyadic interaction, 
since its actors construct meaning with reference to contexts beyond the dyad (Biggemann & 
Buttle, 2007). Halinen et al. (1999) come to similar findings by stressing the possibility of 
connected and disconnected changes within a business relationship dyad. The authors suggest 
that part of the change always remains within a dyad (confined change), whereas some part of 
it may also have effects in the extended network of relationships (connected change). Hence, 
the dyad not only “generates change by itself, but also functions as a recipient and a transmitter 
of change with respect to other relationships in the network” (Halinen et al., 1999, p. 784). 
2.2.2.  Classification and measurement of dyadic adaptations 
Several classification and measurement schemes for dyadic adaptations have been 
proposed by researchers in prior literature and are reviewed by Brennan et al. (2003). 
Håkansson (1982) establishes a classification scheme that entails both suppliers and customers 
divided by: product specification, product design, manufacturing processes, planning, delivery 
procedures, stockholding, administrative procedures, and financial procedures. Turnbull and 
Valla (1986) and Hallén et al. (1991) distinguish between customer and supplier adaptations, 
comprising: product, manufacturing process, payment terms, production, planning, delivery, 
and stocks. Other studies view adaptations unilaterally (e.g . Holmlund and Kock, 1995, as cited 
in Brennan et al., 2003; Cannon, Achrol and Gundlach, 2000, as cited in Brennan et al., 2003). 
Brennan et al. (2003) further builds on Håkansson (1982) and suggests the addition of two 
other categories to his classification, namely, information provision and organization structure. 
The authors defend that such addition improves the classification of adaptation outcomes and 
state that no evidence emerged from prior literature to support the differentiation between 
customer adaptations and supplier adaptations, and, for that reason, “a single classification 
system could be equally well applied to adaptations implemented by supplier and customer 
organizations” (Brennan et al., 2003, p. 1640). Adaptations are therefore classified in terms of: 
production planning and scheduling, stockholding and delivery, product, information exchange, 
production process, financial or contractual terms and conditions, organization structure, and 
other adaptations (Brennan et al., 2003, p. 1641). Schmidt et al. (2007) claim to have found a 
more diverse scheme and state that besides from adaptations of products, production processes 
and logistics explored by the previous research, organizational and behavioral adaptations must 





be taken into consideration as well (e.g. financial and contractual terms/conditions, organization 
structure, and personnel). 
As Brennan et al. (2003) note, the tendency for evaluation of dyadic adaptations lays at the 
self, i.e. individuals tend to emphasize adaptations made by their company instead of 
adaptations made by their counterparts. Because the measurement of adaptation is affected by 
individual perceptions, straightforward unilateral measurement instruments are problematic 
and, ideally, data should be gathered from both ends of the dyad and from more than one 
respondent in each organization, so to obtain deeper consistency (Brennan et al., 2003). A 
similar finding can be drawn from the study by Corsaro and Snehota (2012, p. 279) who state 
that “behaviors in interaction cannot be effectively explained by what the individual party 
knows and intends to do; rather, (…) we need to look closely at joint behaviors and how they 
mutually condition the parties to the relationship”. 
2.3. Mobile advertising and fraud 
2.3.1. Mobile advertising 
The concept of mobile advertising hasn’t yet been attributed a common definition. The 
American Marketing Association (2018) does not provide any definition for mobile advertising 
nor for mobile marketing. The Mobile Marketing Association (2009) defines mobile marketing 
as the “set of practices that enables organizations to communicate and engage with their 
audience in an interactive and relevant manner through and with any mobile device or network” 
and mobile advertising as “a form of advertising that is communicated to the consumer/ target 
via a handset (…), most commonly seen as Mobile Web Banner (top of page), Mobile Web 
Poster (bottom of page banner), and full screen interstitial.” (Mobile Marketing Association, 
2018). Leppäniemi, Karjaluoto and Salo (2004, p. 93) suggest that mobile advertising can be 
defined as “any paid message communicated by mobile media with the intent to influence the 
attitudes, intentions and behavior of those addressed by the commercial messages” through 
mobile devices. 
The personal nature of mobile devices along with the ability to track context-dependent 
information (such as time and location) provides advertising with new opportunities (Barnes, 
2002). Some research has focused on developing mobile advertising specific frameworks and 
on exploring the industry’s potential and implications (Barnes, 2002; Bulander, Decker, 
Schiefer, & Kölmel, 2005; Fanjiang & Wang, 2017; Grewal et al., 2016; Hu, Shin, & Tang, 
2010; Leppäniemi et al., 2004; Park, Shenoy, & Salvendy, 2008). 





Barnes (2002) reviews the emerging technologies, applications and research issues inherent 
to wireless advertising, highlighting the personal, interactive and ubiquitous nature of devices 
as well as their measurability and traceability potentials. The author further highlights the 
opportunity of deepening customer relationships by providing services in a productive and 
context-relevant manner, stating that the convergence between marketing, CRM and mobile 
commerce represents a mighty platform for advertisers. Leppäniemi et al. (2004), on their 
model of mobile advertising value chain, identify five critical factors for the value chain 
creation: content, cross-media marketing, campaign management, customer database, and 
carrier cooperation; and identify as the key players in value chain: the advertisers, the 
advertising companies, the media owners, the traditional advertising agencies, the network 
operators/carriers, the technology providers, and the customers. 
Park et al. (2008) propose a framework for advertising through mobile phones, according 
to three groups of factors: advertisement design, audience, and environment. Similarly, Grewal 
et al. (2016) develop a mobile advertising effectiveness framework and organize it under seven 
components: role of context, consumer-related contextual variables, role of advertising goals, 
relevant outcome metrics, role of advertising elements, market factors, and firm-level macro 
factors. The authors consider the nature of the industry, market differences, the variety of 
devices and carriers, partnerships, government and industry regulations, and privacy concerns 
as crucial forces that may restrain or enable the effectiveness of mobile advertising. Moreover, 
they note the fragmentation on exchange systems and pricing schemes practiced.  
Bulander et al. (2005), in turn, list the main features and challenges of the mobile business 
(e.g. high penetration rate of mobile terminals, multimedia capabilities, interactivity, spam, 
limited user interface, privacy concerns) and stress a core conflict related to the fact that 
personalized advertising requires sensitive information from the user, which brings to light 
tremendous privacy concerns. They further propose a system for mobile advertising that 
considers and balances both ends of the paradigm. The framework proposed by Fanjiang and 
Wang (2017) also aims to solve the problems inherent to mobile ads, suggesting that by using 
context rules, users may be able to filter advertising they’re not interested in, therefore reducing 
spam and increasing the effectiveness of the advertising effort. 
Despite the increasing popularity of mobile in-app advertising, very few studies have 
explored the subject. The existent research mainly focuses on security and privacy concerns 
and issues (e.g. Kim et al., 2011), but some other topics related to in-app advertising have 
started to arouse curiosity among academics. 





Mobile apps can be monetized either through in-app purchases or through in-app 
advertising (Lee & Shin, 2017). Advertisement is a primary business model encouraging app 
developers to distribute their apps for free (Crussel et al., 2014; Cho, Cho, Song, Choi, & Kim, 
2016), in which ad libraries embedded in the app fetch ad content to display to the user using 
the app’s interface (Crussel et al., 2014). However, as Chen, Ji and Copeland (2016) point out, 
a number of criticisms underlie in-app advertising practices: users must passively receive ads 
while using apps; users get nothing from viewing and clicking ads; ad networks may collect 
user’s private information without user’s consent; and irrelevant ads may cause negative 
impressions and harm the advertised brands. 
Chen et al. (2016) present the “In-App AdPay” framework that aims to combine the 
advantages of in-app advertising and in-app billing together so that ad networks can request 
users’ permissions and serve more tailored ads; in return, advertisers must pay targeted users’ 
virtual transactions (e.g. coins or points). In this sense, the authors place the users in the 
monetization loop in order to balance both user’s privacy and experience while securing the 
conditions for the existing monetization strategies. Lee and Shin (2017), for example, contribute 
to the body of literature about the effectiveness of mobile advertising by approaching the effects 
of in-app rewarding on subsequent in-app purchases (applied to the mobile gaming context) 
and discover that in-app rewarding plays a boosting role on subsequent in-app purchases. 
2.3.2. Fraud in the online advertising industry 
Kim et al. (2011) study the emergence of a negative stream of practices associated with the 
new internet technologies to which they call “the dark side of the internet” (e.g. spam, malware, 
hacking, phishing, attacks, invasion of privacy, frauds, violation of digital property rights, etc.) 
and to which they provide taxonomies of the causes, costs and possible responses. The authors 
believe that the nature of the internet works as a major facilitator of the dark side behaviors, not 
only due to the easiness of anonymity, but also due to the availability of highly valuable but 
free resources and services, and identify the reasons behind such behaviors, such as 
psychological factors and the desire for financial gains – this last one serving as a major reason 
for online and ad frauds (Mungamuru & Weis, 2008; Kim et al., 2011) 
The threat of fraud to the advertising business model and ecosystem is a growing concern 
to both academics and practitioners (Crussel et al., 2014; Zhu et al., 2017), since it results in 
reduced ROI for advertisers and an increased portion of wasted advertising budgets (Daswani 
et al., 2008). Existent studies range from the implications of ad fraud, to the technical challenge 





of its detection, and the presentation of solutions for its prevention. However, research is mostly 
focused on the context of desktop advertising and on the so-called click fraud. Consequently, 
mobile advertising fraud has been largely unstudied so far (Crussel et al., 2014; Zhu et al., 2017) 
and many studies fail to approach other types of ad fraud. 
Overall, three major revenue models are commonly used in online ad systems: cost per 
mile (CPM), when the advertiser is charged per thousand impressions delivered; cost per click 
(CPC), when the advertiser is charged per click; and cost per action (CPA), when the advertiser 
is charged per completion of a predetermined action (e.g. an app install, a purchase, a 
subscription) (Daswani et al., 2008; Zhu et al., 2017). Performance-based advertising is a 
particularly significant and attractive method because it allows to track the effectiveness of 
campaigns, as the user actually performs an action beyond clicking the ad (Daswani et al., 2008; 
Cho et al., 2016). Despite this, Shankar and Hollinger (2007) point out to the fact that CPA-
based advertising itself cannot measure ROI of future purchases based simply on a single ad 
exposure and claim that companies cannot make the mistake of basing their metrics on 
transactions instead of customers. 
Put in the simplest form, ad fraud can be differentiated into human and robotic attacks 
(Daswani et al., 2008). The taxonomy suggested by Zhu et al. (2017) classifies ad fraud into 
three major types: ad placements, whose main goal is to manipulate the publisher media space 
or content so to increase the number of impressions or clicks; ad traffic, whose intent is to 
generate fake traffic and inflate the number of impressions or clicks generated from individual 
sites or placements; and ad user actions, whose strategy is to target user’s actions and generate 
revenue. In their taxonomy, impression and click fraud are categorized under the umbrella of 
traffic fraud, while conversion and re-targeting fraud are put under the specter of action fraud. 
Different approaches may be used in each fraud behavior. Fake clicks may be generated 
either by click farms (when cheap human labor is hired to manually click on ads) or by click 
bots (when automated computer systems generate click events that resemble genuine human 
users) (Daswani et al., 2008; Kim et al., 2011; Zhu et al., 2017). Similarly, conversion fraud 
may come from lead farms (when people from under-developed countries are hired to produce 
fake conversions) or by lead bots (when a computer agent automatically fills out lead forms, 
for example, with randomly generated or partially correct data) (Zhu et al., 2017). On the other 
hand, re-targeting fraud is usually achieved exclusively with the use of computer-generated 
agents that mimic human’s intentions and behaviors, deceiving advertisers into the belief that 
traffic is coming from valuable potential customers (Zhu et al., 2017). 





Specific research on fraud and mobile apps is still very limited. Crussel et al. (2014) 
identify two fraudulent behaviors in in-app advertising: requesting ads while the app is on the 
background; and clicking on ads without user interaction. The authors build on the two 
behaviors described and develop “MadFraud”, an analysis tool that allows running several 
Android apps simultaneously in emulators, triggering and exposing ad fraud. They find that 
30% of apps with ads make ad requests while running on the background of a user’s device; in 
addition, they identify twenty-seven apps from their dataset that generate clicks without user 
interaction. Cho et al. (2016) extend the previous work by implementing independent bot 
programs that automatically generate fraudulent click events. The authors target eight 
advertising networks and find out that artificially generated click events are successfully 
approved by six of them, which means they were not able to detect such anomalous click 
attempts. They further propose an advertising system that mitigates click generation software, 
an approach they call “honey advertisement” (Cho et al., 2016). 
Another stream of research has been looking into the impact of fraud in the advertising 
ecosystem. Mungamuru and Weis (2008) propose an economic model of the online advertising 
market focused on the effect of ad fraud, its economic incentives and associated behaviors. The 
model comprises three groups of players – publishers, advertising networks, and advertisers – 
and the central question is whether ad networks have incentives to proactively combat fraud. 
The authors find that ad networks can differ in their ability to filter ad fraud and conclude that 
letting fraud go unchecked is suboptimal and that ad networks can gain competitive advantage 
by aggressively fighting fraud. Daswani et al. (2008) also defends that ad networks have strong 
economic incentives to minimize fraud, as they need to provide advertisers with a better ROI 
in the hope to see their long-term spending increased; besides, by offering lower fraud rates and 
a better ROI, ad networks gain the trust of advertisers and leverage their competitive advantage, 
ultimately increasing their own ROI. In this way, “more efficiently delivering relevant ads to 
legitimate users will benefit all parties in the system – except the fraudsters” (Daswani et al., 
2008, p. 18). Jain, Midha and Animesh (2010), in a study focusing on sponsored search, suggest 
that advertisers are likely to adjust their budget allocation decisions according to their level of 
trust in the intermediary’s technical competence to detect and report fraud. On the other hand, 
Cho et al. (2016) write about economic disincentives and claim that many ad networks might 
rather profit from fraud than from defenses to mitigate such attacks. 
 
 





3. FRAME OF REFERENCE 
Considering the overall purpose of this study and building on the literature review 
presented, a conceptual model to guide the research that will follow is proposed below in Figure 
1. The model builds upon concepts and frameworks of adaptation processes, mobile advertising 
and digital advertising fraud and is mainly supported by the models and findings of Brennan et 
al. (2003), Daswani et al. (2008), Mungamuru and Weis (2008), Jain et al. (2010), Grewal et al. 
(2016) and Zhu et al. (2017) and is organized in three sets of dimensions: MAAE, mobile fraud 
issues, and impact of fraud on the MAAE. 
In order to pursue RQ1’s goal and identify the different players forming the MAAE and 
understand the context of the relationships linking them, two studies are selected at the outset. 
The study by Grewal et al. (2016) becomes relevant because it characterizes the market factors 
that serve as context for the companies operating in the mobile advertising industry. The study 
Figure 1: Conceptual framework. 





by Mungamuru and Weis (2008) outlines the major players in the industry: advertisers, 
advertising networks and publishers.  
To tackle RQ2 and RQ3 and approach how fraud issues impact on the needs to adapt by 
both publishers and advertisers, three studies are selected. The study by Daswani et al. (2008) 
divides digital ad fraud into human and robotic attacks and further suggests the need to pursue 
a fraud auditing by the advertising companies. On the other hand, the study by Zhu et al. (2017) 
presents a taxonomy of ad fraud divided by placement fraud types, traffic fraud types and action 
fraud types. Lastly, Brennan et al. (2003) conduct a comprehensive review of adaptation 
processes’ models and suggest the addition of two complementary variables to the seminal 
model by Håkansson (1982). 
Finally, to grasp RQ4 and identify the main consequences and effects that fraud poses to 
the industry, two studies are selected. Daswani et al. (2008) conclude that fraud is one of the 
main reasons behind the waste of advertising spending, and a cause for unsatisfactory 
advertising ROIs and low profitability levels for all players – advertisers, ad networks and 
publishers. Jain et al. (2010), in turn, point out to a reallocation of advertising budgets according 
to how capable of preventing fraud an advertising company believes a publishing company is. 
 
4. METHODOLOGY  
The method chapter presents the arguments that led to choose the methodological 
approach; the type of sampling, data collection techniques and analytical procedures used; and 
lastly, the major data quality and methodological constraints to consider. 
4.1. Methodological approach 
The research was guided by an interpretivist philosophy, informed by a constructivist 
epistemology (Crotty, 1998). This choice of philosophy is argued to be highly suited in the 
research of complex business settings, for it allows to capture unique contexts, sets of 
circumstances and interactions between individuals: the researcher enters the social world of 
the participants to understand it from their point of view (Saunders et al., 2015), making sense 
and interpreting the meanings with reference to his own values and beliefs (Creswell, 2009). 
Researcher and research object are thus interactively bounded, and constructions are “elicited 
and refined only through interaction between and among investigator and respondents” (Guba 
& Lincoln, 1994, p. 111). 





A mainly deductive approach was adopted since a pre-established framework guided the 
collection of data and the analysis that followed. A descripto-explanatory purpose with a 
multimethod qualitative orientation were chosen to support the case study methodology 
(Saunders et al., 2015). As defined by Yin (2014, p. 16), a case study is “an empirical inquiry 
that investigates a contemporary phenomenon (the “case”) in depth and within its real-world 
context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context may not be clearly 
evident”. The cross-sectional study adopted a single case embedded design supported by a 
revelatory case rationale (Yin, 2014) since the topic under study was largely inaccessible to 
scientific research, and thus advantage was taken from both the privilege of access and the 
preunderstanding of the context by the researcher.  
4.2. Sampling and data collection techniques 
The research used a non-probability purposive sampling (Saunders et al., 2015). The focal 
network of Hang My Ads was selected, both because of access facilitation, and because it 
allowed to collect data from both ends of the advertiser-publisher dyad.  
Hang My Ads is a mobile ad network based in Lisbon, Portugal, and established in 2014. 
The company focuses on mobile app promotion, by targeting apps to the most suited audiences 
on iOS and Android devices, through a multitude of premium apps, websites, and its own offer 
wall product, on a worldwide basis (although TIER 1 and a few countries from TIER 2 represent 
the majority of their inventory). The company’s mission is to “help our advertisers target, 
acquire and engage users across the mobile world, through a wide variety of traffic sources” 
and to “build solutions to better serve app developers on every stage, whether they’re launching 
[the app], making it grow, looking to engage their users or just monetize non-paying users by 
serving our ads” (Hang My Ads, 2018). HMA promotes apps on both incentivized and non-
incentivized traffic, on CPI/CPA/CPE performance models and through several ad formats. 
The APC interviewed is a London, UK, based company, operating since 2012. The 
company holds as core business an incentivized offer wall (mobile and desktop platforms) but 
is able to serve its clients and publishers with an ad network as well. Although mostly focused 
on incentivized traffic, APC promotes non-incentivized ads as well, on both Android, iOS and 
desktop platforms, through CPI/CPA/CPE performance models and using advanced machine 
learning processes to target and optimize traffic. 
The PPC interviewed operates within the digital advertising industry since 2000, being 
headquartered in Minnesota, USA, with offices spread globally in conjunction with its parent 





company headquartered in Guangzhou, China. PPC is a mobile performance solution with an 
ad network as core business, focused exclusively on non-incentivized traffic, but serving ads 
through diverse formats and performance models, for both Android and iOS devices. 
AFSP is a Berlin, Germany, based company, operating since 2013. AFSP offers an affiliate 
fraud detection tool based on machine learning technology and data algorithms, providing 
advertisers with a transparent tool to reveal and reject complex fraud patterns found in 
advertising. 
Data collection comprised both secondary and primary data. Secondary data collection 
consisted of gathering documentary and survey-based materials from online sources, including 
internal reports from the focal firm’s database and published industry materials and news. This 
set of secondary data proved to be useful in the understanding of the phenomenon to study and 
how it develops; in the preparation of the interviews; and, lastly, as a useful source to compare 
primary data against. 
On the other hand, primary data collection used interviews in two fronts: an initial 
unstructured interview aimed at exploring in depth the topic of ad fraud in the MAAE, its 
underlying issues, and the challenges they represent for the parties involved and the broader 
business ecosystem; a second phase consisted of audio recorded semi-structured interviews that 
further explored the topic and dimensions in analysis from a more formal stand and from the 
different perspectives and interpretations of each interviewee. While the first interview captured 
the insights of only HMA’s co-founder and COO, the second stage interviews were split into 
face-to-face and internet-mediated interviews and included: both HMA co-founders – 
respectively, the COO and the CTO (hereinafter referred to as HMA’s COO and HMA’s CTO, 
respectively); one HMA advertiser manager representative (HMA’s AM); one HMA publisher 
manager representative (HMA’s PM); one advertiser partner (APC); one publisher partner 
(PPC); and the managing director of HMA’s anti-fraud software provider company (AFSP). 
The conceptual map developed from the frame of reference earlier presented resulted in 
the construction of seven interview guides (Table 1, Appendix I). The interviews were mainly 
based on a single session per participant, each lasting between 20 minutes and 1 hour, 
depending on the length of the guide; the interview with HMA’s COO was a two-session 
exception, since not only was she the main informant, but was actively involved in the different 
business fronts, with regular interactions with customers, suppliers and other partner companies 
– factors that justified the choice of a longer set of questions. 





After collecting the data, MAXQDA was used to assist the analysis in three phases: first, 
summarising was used to condense the meaning of each interviewee’s answers and to tackle 
the main themes emerging from the interviews; second, primary and secondary data were 
subject to a process of categorization; third, data was unitized (Saunders et al., 2015).  
4.3. Data quality and analysis 
Concerning reliability and validity (Saunders et al., 2015), the use of secondary data and 
interviews was planned and executed with rigor in mind, ensuring the reliability and 
trustworthiness of all the secondary sources; and the careful planning and execution of primary 
data collection, with the necessary transmission of credibility and confidence to the 
interviewees. This process included not only a deep investigation of the research topic prior to 
interview design, but also the pre-test of the guides with field experts. 
 
5. CASE STUDY – THE CASE OF HANG MY ADS 
The chapter that follows presents the case study’s results, according to the research 
framework that guided the data collection: it first includes a mapping of the MAAE at the light 
of the interviewees perceptions; an explanation of the fraud issues that affect the business within 
the MAAE follows; the results from the inquiry over adaptation processes between advertisers 
and publishers are then presented; and finally, the chapter is closed with an overview of the 
effects of fraud in the MAAE. 
5.1. Mapping of the network of the MAAE 
The interviewees’ perceptions over the way the network of the MAAE is organized reveals 
three levels of market players: advertisers (clients), intermediates and publishers (suppliers). 
All interviewees consider the app developers to be on top of the chain, followed by the 
intermediary players – usually ad agencies (which in turn contract advertising services to ad 
networks) or directly ad networks. The ad network then uses a multitude of traffic sources to 
serve an ad, such as: directly integrated apps; publishers (also known as affiliates); platforms 
like ad exchanges, RTBs or DSPs; and/ or other networks (a practice known as re-brokering).  
Advertisers are responsible for managing budget allocation, with the campaigns’ goals and 
the necessary metrics to achieve them in mind; they are also responsible for negotiating 
promotion terms, playing a fundamental role in deciding and implementing performance 
models. On the other end of the chain, publishers are accountable for a deep knowledge of their 
traffic sources and for the best management strategy of their users, so to meet as much as 





possible the advertiser requirements; however, this might not always be the case, as some 
publishers are more concerned in maximizing the profits of their promotion placements, with 
little concerns over quality achieved. Ad networks serve as mediators between the first and the 
former, monitoring in real-time what is being delivered and optimizing performance towards 
the best fit between client requirements and publisher capabilities, ultimately achieving an 
optimal ROI for the campaign. 
While the two HMA account managers consider the agencies that manage most big app 
developers’ campaigns to be the main players within the industry, the company’s co-founders 
name the traffic sources as the most important players, for they have the power to dictate the 
standards for real, fraud-clean and quality traffic across the industry. 
In other markets and business areas a huge importance is given to the client, but I believe 
specifically in digital advertising an equal importance should be assigned to both [client 
and supplier], because you can’t have one without the other. I would even say that often 
the most important ends up being the relationship with the publisher and having good and 
legitimate traffic sources; good clients will eventually follow… Having good publishers 
comes with achieving good clients, more than the other way around. (HMA’s COO) 
By operating as an intermediary between advertisers and publishers, HMA relies on 
different strategies towards relationship management: on one end, clients have the financial 
power and require some work at the level of expectations management; on the other, publishers 
require a careful management of how their traffic is monetized. On either side, a uniform but 
personal approach is pursued, not only when it comes to new business opportunities, but also 
when it comes to daily account-management: the attribution of a dedicated point of contact to 
each business relationship is a standard policy; nevertheless, the importance of the partner may 
dictate higher levels of attention and flexibility towards day-to-day business and negotiations. 
Regarding market factors, major challenges posed by the MAAE are highlighted: lack of 
transparency, often linked to re-brokering the chain; lack of regulation, making it harder to 
standardize processes and seek for specialized support; and the threat of fraud, in terms of 
detection and prevention. Other challenges are related with the increased growth of analytics 
(and the strict quality and user behavior metrics that emerge from this trend); the fierce 
competition between companies (especially ad networks); the difficulties in finding traffic 
sources in certain geographies; and the full understanding of the implications and potentialities 





that different ad formats present, combined with the potential – still to be explored – offered by 
cross-media strategies. 
The interviewees consider that the lack of regulation is justified by the industry being 
relatively recent, explaining that the industry is still at a self-regulation stage, where companies 
adjust themselves to a mix of different laws, from different countries, often at the light of what 
applies to other industries’ services. The lack of specialized entities combined with the fact that 
business takes place in the cloud, make it even harder to apply any concrete laws and creates 
huge uncertainty for companies. Regarding fraud specific legislation, the AFSP representative 
explains why fraud is not covered by industry-specific legislation: 
There’s no specific thing you could put in a law or something... there have been law cases 
and we’ve been asked to testify (…) in some cases, but in general it’s a tricky thing, because 
it’s very difficult to define what fraud is and what is not in concrete legal terms. Also, 
technically it’s not possible to see that the same person installed an app, for example; 
nobody has that technology and even if we had, for privacy reasons it wouldn’t be allowed 
to use it. We’re only looking at assumptions. (AFSP) 
Considered the industry challenge with the heaviest impact on inter-company business, 
fraud is highly linked to the termination of advertiser-publisher partnerships and to the creation 
of great instability, as a consequence of seriously damaging credibility and trust across the 
ecosystem. 
On the other hand, challenges such as the most suited ad formats to use dictate the ways 
companies search for new business partners; and challenges such as the tight competition 
require companies to undergo major efforts to stand-out in the map (be it at the level of their 
service processes, at the level of anti-fraud strategies, etc). 
5.2. Fraud issues within the MAAE 
Major issues are associated with fraud. First, the issue of the lack of transparency in the 
industry has great impact on how fraud develops: mobile is by nature very complex and hard 
to track, a challenge amplified by complex value chains that inflate performances and “create 
opportunities and financial incentives for fraud to happen in the first place” (Forrester 
Consulting, 2017). Hence, re-brokering emerges as one of the greatest cracks through which 
fraudsters exploit the advertising chain and sell bot traffic as human traffic:  





The network places the ads with publishers that it has direct relationships with, but cannot 
itself fulfill the entire ad campaign. (…) So the networks brokers with other networks who 
have access to supply (sub-publishers). (…) In some cases, the re-brokering happens more 
than once. And in the re-brokering process (…) traffic quality can suffer. (Koetsier, 2017)  
Second, not only fraud is never fully identified, but is constantly getting more sophisticated. 
Yet, most advertisers are still unable to identify common and easily traceable frauds, 
underestimating its impact on advertising efforts (Forrester Consulting, 2017). Another major 
issue has to do with the lack of incentives to fight fraud: frauds that steal organic installs are 
the best in the market in terms of user quality metrics; by looking at this data and prioritising – 
without knowing it – fraudulent sources over legitimate ones, advertisers are not only paying 
for installs that otherwise would be free – for being organic –, but are also allowing little space 
for legitimate networks to compete. 
The major fraud behaviors identified within the MAAE vary between simpler and older 
forms of fraud – like the use of VPNs and proxies; the duplication of IPs and other IP anomalies; 
the use of emulator/ bots, and device farms; click flooding/ click spam and install hijacking/ 
click injection – to more complex and recent forms – such as new device fraud; contribution 
rate; and SDK spoofing. A summarising table of the major fraud forms affecting the MAAE is 
presented at Table 2 (Appendix II). 
The most common fraud types HMA deals with are VPNs, install hijacking and click 
spamming. For the managing partners, fraud is a highly relevant topic that requires companies 
to constantly and quickly react and adapt: 
The issue of fraud is very relevant to the industry. It’s vital that companies act swiftly to 
the new types of fraud that emerge – the challenge lies not only in prevention, but also in 
adaptation. (…) Companies must adapt very fast if they want to survive and continue to be 
known for the best reasons in the market. 
At HMA this issue is also very relevant. We end up investing in anti-fraud software 
solutions, adapting our platform to automatically reject conversions that we believe to be 
fraudulent, reacting more promptly and containing the problem. (HMA’s COO) 
Because of damaging past experiences with fraud, and a great concern over the impact it 
may have over their business, HMA has a clear strategy for prevention and defense against 
fraud, by combining real-time data analysis with manual analysis/ validation. Besides from 
constantly analysing the data provided by the MMPs and the third-party fraud detection tool 





integrated with their platform, the platform itself holds some in-house developed capabilities 
for fraud detection and campaign measurement. In terms of campaign and traffic sources 
management, rules that cover the allocation of budgets to sources in the beginning and long-
term stages of the campaigns, help keep track of quality and play a great role in preventing 
major issues should any fraud be spotted. Nevertheless, the company’s COO notes that such 
measure is simultaneously beneficial and limiting since “with so much prevention, sometimes 
we end up stagnating a bit to avoid bad traffic, instead of increasing revenues”. 
HMA’s CTO points out to an important dilemma: although it should be very easy for an 
ad network to bet exclusively on serious and clean traffic, the industry is still at a point where 
the fraudsters score best in quality than the real users, and therefore are often given priority 
over legitimate networks. In such a scenario, an ad network that chooses to completely eradicate 
fraudulent sources may put its chances of survival at risk since the misled expectations of the 
advertisers lead to misled decisions over which sources to allocate budget to. The dilemma lies 
in the fact that the fraudulent installs the advertiser (mistakenly) chooses to pay for, are, in fact, 
organic installs they would never need to pay for – creating a wasted investment gap. 
Fortunately, the trend is starting to change. 
All publishers compete for the best results; some of them use doping, achieving outstanding 
results and forcing others to do the same to avoid being left behind. Slowly, we’re starting 
to see advertisers finally distinguishing between traffic sources and increasingly valuing 
those publishers that are clean from fraud as opposed to those that present them with great 
(often false) numbers. (HMA’s CTO) 
5.3. Adaptation processes 
The data survey on how fraud issues affect the intercompany adaptation processes uses a 
single concept from the research framework – adaptations – that is adapted according to the 
interviewee context: publisher (supplier) or advertiser (client). 
5.3.1. Adaptation processes by publishers 
When asked about the major challenges or struggles faced when working with an 
advertiser, both HMA’s COO and AM reveal feeling difficulties when trying to make the 
company stand out against competing ad networks; furthermore, they link this with the 
challenge of establishing trust at the beginning of a new collaboration: on the one hand, as 
publishers, they try to show the prospective client the ways the company differentiates itself 
through its working processes, its anti-fraud mechanisms, and the outcomes they achieve by 





combining those strategies; on the other, the challenge of trust is also dependent on how each 
client works, and, especially, how the first few month’s validation of numbers, fraud claims and 
payments comply with the agreed terms and deadlines. Another great challenge highlighted by 
HMA’s COO and the PPC is the threat of fraud to the relationship, the need to constantly stay 
on top of it and, ultimately, the struggle it causes when trying to balance volume and quality 
expectations without damaging the relationship. 
In an early stage of the relationship, it’s difficult to deliver the volumes [advertisers] expect, 
without being afraid to reach them; it depends on the campaigns, but some campaigns have 
various performance metrics, others various anti-fraud metrics; such metrics often require 
some time to evaluate, and we feel afraid. (HMA’s COO) 
When the industry first started off, five years ago or so, it started to trigger installs, but no 
one was looking at quality, no one was looking at fraud. Now, plenty of advertisers not 
only require that everyone stay on top of fraud but quality too (…). The broader issue is 
that everyone wants quality users, but they also want scale; and finding the right sources 
that can deliver a high number of installs with the quality they want is a big challenge. 
(PPC) 
Adding to these challenges, HMA’s AM highlights that often publishers feel obliged to 
comply with advertisers’ demands, especially when they fail to comply with the agreed 
contractual or financial terms: “I need them more than they need me, so I have to give way of 
some of my own demands sometimes”. 
Besides from demanding the use of direct traffic and making some requirements over the 
type promotion options, budgets and KPIs to work under, not many requirements are imposed 
by advertisers. The early stage of the relationship is characterized by a mutual process of 
negotiations around legal and financial terms and guarantees, payment and activity validation 
deadlines, and some general demands over the contracted advertising service – all clearly stated 
and signed by both parties on a so-called insertion order (IO). At this point, advertisers are 
mostly concerned over: the publisher being a good fit with the advertiser’s goals; having return 
from the time invested in opening the new collaboration; the publisher being clean of fraud and 
not re-brokering the advertiser’s campaigns; the publisher’s reputation in the industry. 
All interviewees agree that fraud is a highly relevant issue in the MAAE, often leading to 
advertiser-publisher relationships’ dissolution. As PPC notes, “It’s not just convincing someone 
you don’t have fraud, because fraud is everywhere in the industry”, explaining that “what is 





expected is that we’re on top of it as much as possible (…) and that we’re working to catch up 
with fraud”. Publisher’s strategies to transmit confidence and credibility to an advertiser range 
from constantly monitoring and optimizing campaigns towards industry’s guidelines for fraud 
alerts; to a proactively assuming fraud when it happens and immediately applying measures 
that avoid further damage, as opposed to trying to get it unnoticed – as HMA’s COO notes. 
Adjustments at various levels need to be made by publishers to meet advertiser’s 
requirements/ concerns over fraud: as their direct developer’s portfolio grows, publishers need 
to increase their access to anti-fraud tools and maintain close communications with MMPs and 
other relevant companies that help them identify fraud as it develops. In addition, publishers 
adapt their approach towards seeking new business with advertisers and some – like HMA – 
are even making efforts to join anti-fraud coalitions.  
The service planning and scheduling process may always differ, depending on the 
advertiser, the budget provided, and the stability of the campaign(s); prices may be subject to 
negotiations, and budgets and KPIs are usually subject to reviews and adjustments according 
to the outcomes of optimizing each campaign; furthermore, some bigger players in the ad 
networks market have specific departments dedicated to outlining tailor-made promotion 
strategies to each advertiser, in order to optimize the service delivered as better as possible – as 
is the case with PPC.  
Information exchange is another process that varies widely from advertiser to advertiser 
but is usually not subject to significant adaptations, as long as communications are kept as open 
as possible between the parties, and the advertiser is willing to share campaign specific 
information (unfortunately, not always taken for granted) – such as quality feedbacks. To get 
around information exchange barriers, HMA makes a major effort to gain access to their client’s 
campaign analysis tools, which not only provides the company with a deeper control over 
campaign performance, but also saves the client a considerable amount of time, by cutting the 
need of feedback reports – the major adaptation lies in adjusting the analysis to the different 
MMP platforms used by advertisers. Adaptations at the level of the production process, depend 
largely on how well established the relationship is and on the information exchanged, since as 
more information is provided, the better campaigns can be optimized towards advertiser’s 
objectives – although the specific goals/ metrics that evaluate a campaign’s performance do not 
change, budgets and prices may do so while the campaign is delivered, depending on how well 
quality expectations are being met. 





Financial and contractual terms and conditions rarely undergo changes after the initial 
agreement between the parties, unless extraordinary legal/ regulatory circumstances require so. 
However, as HMA’s AM notes, the validation of numbers and payments have been getting 
gradually delayed, as the need for deeper/ longer investigations of the traffic delivered increases 
on advertiser’s end. Organizational structure adaptations are also very rare: at HMA the only 
significant change was the creation of a client dedicated specific team, two years ago. 
Other changes may take place, depending on each company’s needs: for example, at PPC 
a dedicated fraud team was created to handle fraud claims; similarly, HMA is constantly 
improving its own platform as a way of increasing its anti-fraud/ performance evaluation 
processes. Furthermore, minor adaptations from a publisher may be needed to meet and fulfill 
each advertisers’ requirements and processes, as well as to effectively manage the relationship: 
“only after a month of activity can you understand what works and what needs to be adjusted 
in terms of fraud, in terms of KPIs, etc; before that, this is all a little uncertain” (HMA’s COO). 
When fraud happens, two scenarios are possible. If the fraud event has a minor impact on 
the relationship, the situation is discussed with the advertiser and specific measures are 
immediately put in place (e.g. banning the fraudulent sources, adjusting processes), to avoid the 
same issue happening again. If, instead, the episode is more serious – either because it results 
in great revenue losses that seriously damage the relationship, or because the relationship is just 
not enough established to overcome the issue –, dissolution of the relationship is usually at risk. 
In such cases, although rare, future cooperation may be a possibility: the publisher should either 
have available a new product/ traffic inventory, or be able to show complete understanding of 
what factors caused the previous issue and what counter-measures were taken; another factor 
that may increase the chances of relationship reestablishment is, as HMA’s AM notes, the fact 
that most MAAE companies reveal huge turnover rates among account managers, sometimes 
creating great gaps in past relationships’ historic. 
5.3.2. Adaptation processes by advertisers 
When working with a publisher, advertisers point out several challenges. During an initial 
stage, challenges vary between making sure the traffic the publisher is selling is real, making 
sure there is a fit between the companies, and deciding whether to pursue a collaboration; 
understanding the publisher’s technical and anti-fraud capabilities; negotiating the various 
service, financial and contractual terms; and making any necessary technical adjustments to the 
publisher. After the collaboration starts, advertisers highlight as particularly challenging: the 





establishment of trust in the publisher; making sure the traffic used is really the traffic agreed 
upon; gathering as much information as possible about the publisher and creating a database as 
complete as possible about his traffic sources, to help allocating budgets and avoiding 
deductions as efficiently as possible; accurately analysing the collected information to support 
decision-making in case a fraud or any other issue puts the relationship future at risk. 
At the beginning of a partnership, publishers usually require advertisers legal and financial 
information/ proofs; direct offers (usually with a maximum of two intermediates); regular 
optimizations that minimize deductions and help maximize revenues; and a pre-agreement over 
how fraud is handled and reported. Requirements over minimum monthly revenues or other 
specific conditions although less common may also occur. At this stage, the major concerns of 
a publisher are: making sure there is a good fit between the campaigns available and the traffic 
he can use, allowing for a good quality-scale balance and making it worth the time invested in 
integrating with the advertiser’s tracking system; making sure the advertiser complies with the 
agreed payment terms; and making sure the advertiser’s processes allow for maximum 
automation, so to maximize profits.  
For advertisers, the issue of fraud in the MAAE is highly relevant and is associated with 
trust issues – particularly at the early stages of a relationship – and possible dissolution of 
collaborations. Along with performance and traffic quality, fraud dictates the potential and 
duration of advertiser-publisher relationships. To prevent fraud from a publisher, advertisers 
focus their strategies mostly on anti-fraud software tools with human validation; updated 
records of each publisher’s performance and traffic sources are created to support decision-
making if need be. In addition, as HMA’s PM explains, initial trust on a publisher is largely 
dependent on the type of traffic he has to offer, dictating how his budgets are allocated, which 
campaigns he’s given access to, and the classification he’s assigned. 
To avoid and deal with fraud from publishers, advertisers undertake adaptations at various 
levels. Advertisers need to make a constant effort to be on top of fraud, not only by investing 
in more/ better own and third-party anti-fraud mechanisms, but also by increasing the analytics 
behind campaigns’ and publishers’ performance evaluation. The approach towards seeking 
partnerships with new publishers is another dimension of change: the focus increasingly shifts 
from ad networks to direct sources of traffic; a deeper and wider set of filter questions is adopted 
at the early process of evaluating a publisher’s potential; an effort is made to make sure the 
publisher’s technical and integration capabilities are in line with the type of traffic he’s selling; 
the sending of device ID information is requested as another measure to assure in-app traffic is 





used; lastly, initial tests with the publisher are undertaken, to decide whether the collaboration 
is worth pursuing and to minimize the chances of the advertiser getting severely damaged by 
fraud. Company-specific adaptations may also occur: at HMA, the PM explains that a grading 
system was implemented to classify publishers according to the traffic each provided, and that 
small test budgets are given at the start of a campaign to all publishers to help decide which 
ones are most suited to keep delivering it – “this way creating a safety net in case anything goes 
wrong; of course sporadic issues may happen, by we try to avoid them as much as possible by 
constantly trying to adapt and improve our prevention measures”. 
Regarding service planning and scheduling, the adaptation is an ongoing process while a 
campaign is live, mostly happening at the levels of budget allocation and calculation of prices 
– according to the type of promotion each publisher provides, the relationship historic and the 
publisher’s performance; pause, restart and end dates may also be subject to adaptations, 
especially when unexpected issues occur – e.g. orders coming from the developer or fraud/ 
quality issues. Similarly, the production process may lead to technical adaptations and the 
optimization process may need adjustments – depending on the campaign, its KPIs and the 
publishers running it; overall, this process is characterized by constant adaptations. 
In contrast, information exchange does not require significant adaptations since most 
processes are automatic: at HMA, for example, most optimizations can be done exclusively 
using their own platform and integrated tools, reducing the need to discuss them with 
publishers. Unless a fraud issue is spotted, there is no need to request much information to the 
publisher while the campaign is live since the promotion terms have previously been agreed 
upon; on the other hand, if there are fraud suspicions/ claims, specific evidence of the promotion 
may be requested to the publisher. Regarding financial and contractual terms and conditions, 
while APC notes specific terms may be agreed with a publisher and later be subject to change 
if the service provided is not satisfactory, both HMA’s COO and PM deny making any changes 
beyond the initial agreement between the parties (IO). As for organizational structure, 
adaptations are rare: at HMA the only significant adaptation was the creation of a publisher 
dedicated specific team. 
Other adaptations by advertisers include: specific technical arrangements for a publisher, 
depending on how valuable the relationship is; and specific procedures and mechanisms that 
help preventing high-impact deductions in cases of fraud or poor quality delivered by a 
publisher. 





When fraud happens, the importance of the relationship with the publisher determines its 
future. If the episode has a minor impact on the overall publisher activity, immediate measures 
are put in practice (e.g. banning the fraudulent sources, restricting the number of campaigns the 
publisher gets access to) and the account is kept active. Instead, if the episode has a major 
impact – either because the relationship is too recent and/ or because trust gets seriously 
damaged – the relationship might be immediately terminated without chances of further 
collaboration.  
Ending a relationship is the most drastic decision an advertiser makes, and, unfortunately, 
it’s been happening several times over the years – as HMA’s COO notes. APC explains that 
“it’s all about the relationship” and that “if someone is very valuable to us, we will go a very 
long distance to keep them happy and ourselves happy with the traffic”. Furthermore, if not 
terminated, after a serious fraud issue, the partnership undoubtedly suffers a tremendous fall in 
monthly revenues as a result of the loss of trust in the publisher: “I need to focus my time into 
the best sources” (HMA’s PM). If terminated, neither HMA nor APC have policies against 
future cooperation, however, they don’t see any prospects in doing so either. APC believes re-
establishing the partnership is possible in cases the relationship was not fully ended but, instead, 
just restricted, as long as the publisher is able to demonstrate he has taken measures that prevent 
the same issue from happening again; HMA’s PM explains the relationship historic remains as 
an obstacle and although the same conditions are imposed, fewer chances are given to the 
publisher; HMA’s COO believes re-establishing the partnership is very rare and “usually 
doesn’t go very well, and the relationship is definitely terminated”. 
5.4. Effects of fraud in the MAAE 
The monthly revenue lost for fraud “depends on the company and its strategies to prevent 
and handle fraud” (HMA’s COO). At HMA the average monthly loss is around 5-10%, a 
number that has been decreasing year by year: “We take very few risks when it comes to new 
campaigns and have several preventive measures in place instead. We play it safe, and we 
naturally get less deductions (HMA’s COO). 
In contrast, AFSP estimates that around 10-15% of the global advertising spend goes into 
fraud. Industry’s statistics reveal similar numbers: a report released by Tune – an MMP – finds 
that the average fraud across all ad networks is 15.17%, of which 23.3% of ad networks record 
fraud levels surpassing 20% (Koetsier, 2017); AppsFlyer – another MMP – estimates that the 
odds of an app install being fraudulent are 11.5% and that the global cost of fraud to advertisers 





has grown 30% from roughly $600 million a quarter in 2017 to $700-$800 million over the first 
quarter of 2018 (AppsFlyer, 2018). Accordingly, not only the amount of fraud advertisers are 
subject to has been increasing, it now affects over half of the mobile ad budgets (Forrester 
Consulting, 2017). 
Apart from the great financial impact of fraud created by the large portions of advertising 
budgets being exposed and/ or lost to fraud, the issue directly affects advertisers’ ROI, causing 
the acquisition prices to be lower and leading to a constant experimentation of new advertising 
models as an attempt to hinder fraudulent activity. The planning and allocation of budgets is 
another aspect affected by fraud: the degree of fraud from a partner dictates how heavily 
reduced or completely cut their budgets get; trust and budget allocation go hand in hand, so 
publishers with less fraud are seen with “more respect” (HMA’s COO) and gain priority to 
“access better campaigns and better payouts” (APC); furthermore, advertisers start to rethink 
and re-plan their investments (Mobile Marketing Association, 2017). 
Other aspects get severely affected by fraud. The most obvious being the damage in 
intercompany relationships, as well as in the industry’s reputation, since trust between 
advertisers and publishers gets challenged and the integrity of the ecosystem gets degraded. 
Efficiency in business is also lost, due to the contamination of data and the huge investment of 
time spent in its undermined analysis: “artificially fraudulent inventory floods the market and 
decreases the value of legitimate (real human) inventory” (IAB, 2013). Also important is the 
damage fraud causes to users’ experience, who are served poor quality ads or are redirected to 
different ads after the click. As AFSP notes, fraud is still seen as a sort of taboo topic in the 
MAAE, lacking openness to discuss it: on the advertiser side, fraud looks bad to his investors 
and, on top of this, attracts more fraud; networks, on the other hand, are faced with a dilemma 
between delivering a high-quality service to advertisers in order to maintain a good reputation 
and fulfilling their traffic needs; often “the investor body is not familiar with the issue, thinking 
it’s just a matter of buying from a better source, without fully grasping the real dimension of 
the problem and the issues it causes every day” (AFSP). 
Industry companies forecast that fraud will keep evolving into more sophisticated and 
diversified forms, requiring companies to keep adapting and finding ways to track and stop it, 
eventually eradicating older and fully preventable forms of fraud. Along the course, the 
investment in more specialized software companies will keep growing, increasing the 
complexity in the metrics available and widening its share along the chain. Thus, the increasing 
demand for transparency will lead to significant changes in the way the mobile supply chain 





operates, revealing an increase in anti-fraud publishers’ certifications and a trend for 
disintermediation of the chain: HMA, for example, has been reshaping its partner portfolio over 
the last year, by reducing to the minimum the number of intermediates up to the final traffic 
source, not only to reduce fraud, but also to increase control over the campaign. Lastly, 
companies will keep experimenting with promotion models as a strategy to avoid fraud and 
increase the efficiency of investments, leading to the shrinkage – already underway – of the 
incentivized business. 
As for fighting fraud, every player should get involved if they want to survive in the 
industry, but MMPs “will play the largest role, without doubt” (HMA’s CTO): not only do they 
have credibility and assume an impartial position in the chain, but they also have the largest 
data sets and mechanisms to detect fraudulent patterns first-hand. The win over fraud will, 
therefore, be largely linked to the extent to which companies get access to more transparent and 
automated detection systems and to the necessary improvement in data interpretation 
capabilities across all partners in the chain; in addition, advertisers should adopt appropriate 
volume/ performance expectations and increase complexity in campaign metrics; partnerships 
should be used strategically as a wall of resistance against fraud, by encouraging the creation 
of open communication channels and speeding up the share of information; companies should 
practice safe sourcing, by carefully choosing their traffic sources and by joining anti-fraud 
industry efforts; finally, payment for fraud should be blocked in a more stricter sense and 
suspicious sources should be blacklisted. 
 
6. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
Analysis of the qualitative data reveals that the economic model proposed by Mungamuru 
and Weis (2008) does not fully picture the outline of the MAAE. While the authors suggest that 
the online advertising market players can be organized into advertisers, advertising networks, 
and publishers, the data collected demonstrates that the MAAE should be organized into 
advertisers, intermediates, and publishers. By replacing “ad networks” by “intermediates”, one 
is allowing for a wider range of advertiser-publisher mediator companies along the chain to be 
considered, a change that feels highly suited in the context of the company studied and the 
outline of the MAAE. 
Advertisers represent the highest rank in the chain because they fund the entire ecosystem. 
Both app developers and the ad agencies responsible for managing their budgets are included 





in the advertisers’ group. Furthermore, app developers can simultaneously be advertisers and 
publishers: first, they may need to acquire users for their app by advertising it on other apps/ 
media sources; on the other hand, they may need to monetize their “free” app by serving other 
apps/ brands’ ads to their users. Hence, on the bottom of the chain are the publishers, who 
represent the supply of the industry and generate traffic to the top of the chain. 
Intermediates manage ads from several app developers and ad spaces from several media 
sources. Included in this group are ad networks – as suggested by Mungamuru and Weis (2008) 
–, who buy traffic directly with the media source or through another intermediary, such as an 
AdExchange/ DSP or another ad network. AdExchanges/ DSPs, in turn, facilitate the 
transaction of online ad impressions by connecting advertisers – be they app developers, ad 
agencies or ad networks – with a vast inventory of media sources, usually through RTB systems 
and machine learning algorithms designed to offer more precise and refined targeting solutions 
with constantly optimized eCPMs to maximize conversion rates.  
Intermediates play a crucial role in mediating both ends of the chain and effectively 
reaching an optimal fit between campaign goals and traffic delivered, ultimately, achieving the 
best outcomes in terms of user quality and ROI. Thus, one can speculate that intermediates can 
work as game-changers in assuring the availability of a legitimate, clean of fraud and high-
quality inventory of media sources, since the data demonstrates that only with good publishers 
can an ad network close valuable deals with app developers. 
The suggestion to include an additional group of players seems pertinent: technology 
companies would include those platforms such as AdExchanges, DSPs and SSPs that work as 
intermediates, but also those companies providing in-app measurement and tracking solutions 
(MMPs), as well as those companies developing and providing fraud detection tools. A visual 
scheme of the MAAE mapping is presented in Figure 3 (Appendix II). 
Supporting the findings of Grewal et al. (2016), the data confirms that market factors such 
as nature of industry, partnerships, and regulations present companies operating in the MAAE 
with important restrictions and opportunities. Furthermore, Grewal et al. (2016) draw attention 
to the fragmentation of the chain, that leads to opacity in exchange systems and complex pricing 
schemes, challenges also brought up by the data. However, the case study’s results do not reveal 
sufficient data to support the market differences’ factor also listed by the authors. 
Advertiser-publisher relationships in the MAAE are usually characterized by uniform 
management strategies with some degree of personalization. At the start of a new business 





relationship, the major challenges for advertisers lay in the initial negotiation process and in 
making sure the traffic to receive is direct (not re-brokered); on the other hand, the major 
challenge for publishers lays in effectively managing quality-volume expectations at such an 
early stage of partnership. Both advertisers and publishers agree that the establishment of 
mutual trust and the threat of fraud are also major challenges at the start of a relationship, and 
that assuring enough business volumes that compensate for the time invested in opening the 
relationship is a major concern. 
Fraud, lack of transparency, and quality/ re-brokering stood out as the greatest challenges 
faced by companies in the ecosystem; disintermediation, sustainable growth/ competition, and 
lack of regulation followed. The six appear to be highly related. One of the facts that makes 
fraud a major issue is the opacity of the chain associated with it, creating space and 
opportunities for illegitimate activities to happen in the first place; the lack of transparency also 
makes advertisers worry about the content and context in which their ads appear, putting at risk 
their brand’s image and reputation and creating great difficulties for campaign performance and 
optimization. The longer the chain, the cheapest the traffic and the worst quality gets; the fact 
that good media sources tend to work more closely to the app developer/ agency, probably 
explains why re-brokering is so strongly associated with fraudulent traffic and why advertisers 
are not only demanding more transparency, but leaning towards a trend of disintermediation of 
the chain. In turn, disintermediation restricts the space to do business in the ecosystem, 
tightening the competition between companies and making it harder for each to stand out. 
Finally, the fact that the industry lacks specific regulation further emphasizes the difficulties 
felt, creating uncertainty and a lack of legislative support when conflicts arise. 
In terms of different types of fraud, the qualitative data reveals a different classification 
scheme than the ones proposed by Daswani et al. (2008) and Zhu et al. (2017). The distinction 
between robotic and human attacks suggested by Daswani et al. (2008) does not seem to be 
significant in the context of the case study, for two reasons: first, all interviewees preferred to 
group different forms of attack under the single umbrella of mobile app fraud; second, all forms 
of attack make use to a greater or lesser extent of computer technology and programmed scripts, 
therefore being “robotic” by nature. On the other hand, the taxonomy of digital ad fraud 
provided by Zhu et al. (2017) that makes a distinction between placement fraud, action fraud, 
and traffic fraud appears to be little suited as well: firstly, Hang My Ads operates exclusively 
on performance-based advertising models, which immediately excludes forms grouped under 
placement fraud and traffic fraud from its operating context; secondly, the model proposed by 





the authors pictures the phenomenon of fraud in the broader digital advertising industry and, 
naturally, one must take into consideration that the evolution from web to mobile brought about 
new forms of attack, leaving others behind.  
Instead, the data collected finds that the forms that deserve to be mentioned as the major 
ones affecting advertising in the MAAE are: VPN fraud, IP fraud (particularly IP duplication), 
click flooding/ click spam, install hijacking/ click injection, bots, new devices, SDK spoofing, 
and farms. A more appropriate classification of such forms can be suggested: VPN, IP 
duplication and IP pattern can be grouped under the broader category of IP-Based Fraud; off-
server bot, device-based malware and SDK spoofing can be grouped under Bot-Based Fraud; 
click flooding/ click spam and install hijacking/ click injection can be grouped under Click-
Based Fraud; finally, new devices can be assigned to Farm-Based Fraud. 
The dataset confirms the high relevance of fraud to advertiser-publisher relationships. Both 
the case study and the secondary data highlight that fraud is the number one cause of trust 
problems within client-supplier relationships, playing a central role in company reputation and 
often damaging intercompany partnerships. When fraud episodes do not end up in partnership 
termination, they certainly impact on the way the relationship develops, often demanding 
significant levels of advertiser-publisher adaptations. Fraud requires companies to quickly react 
and adapt in order to protect partnerships and stand out for the best reasons – this way, the data 
allows to infer that not only must companies seek a constant update over new and emerging 
forms of fraud, but also must undertake ongoing investments to improve their prevention and 
detection mechanisms, and, additionally, must work towards improving their sourcing to offer 
a cleaner traffic inventory. Such findings are in line with those of Brennan and Turnbull (1997b) 
that unilateral or mutual adaptation represents the ability of a company to react to environmental 
and market forces, being it a necessary condition for the existence of a partnership, its survival 
and its success. Additionally, the case study’s results confirm the hypothesis presented by 
Hallén et al. (1991), and later emphasized by Brennan et al. (2003), that intercompany 
adaptations work as elements of a social exchange process and involve trust-building and power 
relations. For example, HMA’s AM admits that often she needs to give in to the demands of 
some app developers and adjust some standard processes in order to close a deal. 
Taking on the model proposed by Brennan et al. (2003), it can be agreed from the research 
that the single adaptations classification scheme is equally suited to adaptations undertaken by 
supplier and client organizations. The interviews disclose no significant difference between the 
number of adaptations undertaken by advertisers and by publishers, revealing that both parties 





seem to adapt to each other in a similar manner. One can conclude that the findings by previous 
research that suppliers adapt more than customers (Baptista, 2013; Brennan et al., 2003; 
Schmidt et al., 2007) are not exactly applicable to the present study.  
Nevertheless, differences in the processes advertiser and publisher adapt are spotted. 
Service planning and scheduling and production processes are subject to more adaptations from 
advertisers, with publishers only doing minor adaptations depending on the degree of freedom/ 
power advertisers give them over campaign management. Adaptations at the levels of 
information exchange and production process seem to be largely dependent from each other: 
for example, the more feedback and details on campaign performance the advertiser provides 
(information exchange), the higher the level of traffic optimization (production process) the 
publisher can do. An interesting finding that can be taken from the case study is the fact that 
although advertisers are the clients, they appear to be the ones investing the most time in the 
production process, in the sense that they often make all decisions regarding campaign 
optimization and budget re-allocation without the publisher participating in the discussion. In 
contrast, adaptations of financial and contractual terms and conditions emerge as unlikely or 
rare from either advertiser or publisher. The same happens with organization structure 
adaptations, although it can be understood from the research that larger companies have evolved 
to the creation of specific departments that handle fraud issues: for example, the PPC has a 
dedicated fraud team that analyses in detail any fraud claims received and withholds payments 
of fraudulent traffic from its media sources. Adaptations at “other” processes, although less 
mentioned, are more commonly made by advertisers: for example, HMA changed its internal 
processes for sourcing new business with publishers, by implementing more extensive sets of 
selection criteria and questions. 
Overall, it can be understood from the interviews that companies mostly adapt to meet the 
broader needs/ requirements of their partnership portfolio or to respond to industry forces – 
such as when HMA created a grading scheme to classify its publisher inventory and match their 
traffic with their advertiser inventory according to the app fit and the campaign sensitivity. 
Specific adaptations made to specific partners appear to be rarer and are mentioned only once 
at the dataset, when the APC explains the specific technical arrangement made to adapt to a 
valuable publisher whose app was experiencing a breach that allowed fraudsters to exploit 
campaigns and illegitimately get rewards for engagement actions they hadn’t completed – 
something that was built specifically to solve a problem with a specific publisher and was never 
used for any other publisher.  





Nonetheless, adaptations that emerge from specific fraud issues with specific partners may 
end up having positive outcomes in other relationships – such as when one of the advertisers 
working with the PPC developed his own tool to profile users and started cutting the budgets 
for promotion with the PPC; although later the PPC managed to develop new core processes to 
optimize its traffic and meet the advertiser’s requirements, the relationship state had no turn 
back, but at least the new processes were being used by the PPC itself to evaluate its media 
sources. These findings come to confirm the inferences made by Anderson et al. (1994) and 
Halinen et al. (1999) regarding the possibility of connected and disconnected changes taking 
place within the dyad and the network effects of dyadic interaction – in this case, the network 
effects of adaptations generated within an advertiser-publisher relationship and propagating to 
the extended partnership portfolio. 
Regarding the effects of fraudulent activities in the MAAE, the findings by Daswani et al. 
(2008) are confirmed by the case study: fraud has a negative financial impact in the ecosystem, 
leading to a great portion of the advertising spend to be wasted with fake or poor-quality traffic 
and, consequently, to poor results in terms of ROI for advertisers. Yet, an interesting fact is 
brought up by the AFSP interview: fraud does have a negative effect on the advertising ROI, 
but prices already account for a certain level of fraud if one thinks that without fraud publishers 
would be delivering only top users and therefore acquisition prices would be much higher than 
they are today with fraud, in which case ROI would naturally be much higher as well. The 
findings by Jain et al. (2010) that advertisers are likely to adjust their budget allocation 
strategies depending on the intermediary/ publisher’s competence to detect and report fraud are 
also confirmed by the case study. In fact, the data reveals that advertisers’ budget allocation 
decisions are dependent not only on the publisher’s capability to handle fraud, but, above all, 
in the overall trust the advertiser has in the intermediary/ publisher’s traffic. Also related to 
budget allocation, is the fact that advertisers constantly seek for and experiment with new 
advertising models in an attempt to avoid fraud and maximize ROI. 
Furthermore, the data collected shows that other effects need to be considered when 
evaluating the impact of fraud on the MAAE, namely: damages to intercompany relationships; 
negative effects on user experience; damages to the industry’s reputation; lastly, a negative 
impact on companies’ efficiency, since it contaminates and inflates tracked data, therefore 
requiring companies to engage in time-consuming processes of data analysis and validation. 





Although in some way the data collected confirms there is a problem of disincentives to 
fight fraud, it also leads one to agree with the research outcomes by Mungamuru and Weis 
(2008) and Daswani et al. (2008): companies should not let go fraud unchecked and ad 
networks, in particular, can gain significant competitive advantage if they aggressively fight 
fraud, by providing advertisers with better ROIs, and by improving their own and their 
publishers profitability. Despite this, the economic disincentives mentioned by Cho et al. (2016) 
cannot be disregarded and similar findings emerge from both the secondary data collected and 
the case study; however, such trend is considered to be changing as the industry evolves to more 
Figure 2: Modified framework of analysis. 





accurately detect and handle fraud, and, therefore, intermediates that choose to not participate 
in the fight towards mitigating fraud, will eventually be eradicated. 
The case study outcomes and analysis allow to suggest a modified framework of analysis: 
the original frame of reference and the literature review serve as a starting point to improve the 
model used to guide the research, by adjusting the dimensions under study to the findings that 
emerged. The modified framework of analysis presented in Figure 2 entails the necessary 
changes/ improvements at the levels of market factors, market players, types of fraud and effects 




The final chapter of this dissertation sums up the findings of the study against the research 
questions initially presented. A brief reflection over the theoretical contribution of the study 
follows; and relevant recommendations for further research and for management close this 
work. 
As smartphone usage keeps growing, advertising investment has been increasingly 
targeting mobile media, particularly, mobile apps. The scale of mobile ad fraud has been 
following the trend, posing great challenges to the way companies relate with their partners and 
adapt to each other. Thus, the research aimed to understand how fraud in the mobile advertising 
industry affects intercompany relationships, particularly between advertisers and publishers: it 
started by looking at how the MAAE is organized and how companies partner with each other; 
it continued with an analysis of how fraud affects the adaptation processes undertaken by 
companies; and it finalized with a sum up of the main effects of fraud in the ecosystem. 
Although similar to what Mungamuru and Weis (2008) suggest, the findings of this study 
reveal that the MAAE should be organized into advertisers (app developers and ad agencies), 
intermediates (ad networks and AdExchanges/ DSPs), and publishers (app developers or other 
media sources). In addition, the suggestion of a fourth group of players feels pertinent within 
the context of the MAAE: considered as technology companies are not only the AdExchanges, 
DSPs and SSPs that simultaneously belong to the intermediates group, but also MMPs and anti-
fraud software providers. Even though simply pictured, the ecosystem’s outline emerges as a 
very complex setting with no clear boundaries between players, since app developers 
simultaneously contract advertising campaigns and serve other developer’s ads on their apps; 





on the other hand, ad networks simultaneously work as suppliers and customers; publishers, in 
turn, are often not the final source of traffic. 
Several issues emerge from this sort of ecosystem mapping. In line with Grewal et al. 
(2016), the data confirms that market factors such as the nature of industry, partnerships, and 
regulations present companies with significant restrictions and opportunities that impact their 
activities; the market differences’ variable, in contrast, does not find enough data in the study 
to support the authors’ model. Amongst the main challenges faced by industry’s professionals, 
issues such as fraud, lack of transparency, quality, competition, lack of regulation, and 
fragmentation of the chain emerge as some of the highest impactors to intercompany 
relationships. All challenges appear to be highly interrelated. 
Regarding how fraud affects the adaptation processes undertaken by advertisers and 
publishers, the research is divided into a comprehension of the different types of fraud that 
threaten mobile app advertising, and an understanding of how they influence the need for 
companies to adapt to each other. The classification schemes presented by Daswani et al. (2008) 
and Zhu et al. (2017) do not appear to accurately classify the forms of fraud that most affect the 
MAAE companies of the focal context under study. Instead, the major forms that emerge can 
be classified under the umbrellas of IP-Based Fraud, Bot-Based Fraud, Click-Based Fraud and 
Farm-Based Fraud; and vary between VPN fraud, IP fraud, click flooding/ click spam, install 
hijacking/ click injection, bots, new devices, SDK spoofing, and farms.  
The case study confirms the high relevance of fraud to advertiser-publisher relationships, 
often leading to trust and reputation issues, and demanding significant levels of adaptations to 
protect partnerships. The single adaptations classification scheme proposed by Brennan et al. 
(2003) proved to be appropriate to the study, since no difference was found in the processes 
advertisers and publishers adapt as a consequence of fraud. Contrasting with prior literature 
(Baptista, 2013; Brennan et al., 2003; Schmidt et al., 2007), advertisers and publishers in the 
MAAE seem to adapt to each other in a similar manner. Despite this, differences may be 
identified: service planning and scheduling and production process are subject to more 
adaptations from advertisers; adaptations at the levels of information exchange and production 
process seem to be largely dependent from each other, but contrary to what might be expected, 
advertisers (customers) appear to invest considerably more resources than publishers in 
production process adaptations; on the other hand, adaptations of financial and contractual 
terms and conditions emerge as unlikely or rare from either party; organization structure 
adaptations appear to be largely dependent on company size; finally, adaptations of “other” 





processes appear to be more common by advertisers. Specific adaptations made to fit specific 
partners emerge from the case study as rare; instead, companies work towards adapting their 
overall working processes to better handle fraud issues and better manage relationships with 
their partners. The arguments by Anderson et al. (1994) and Halinen et al. (1999) regarding the 
possibility of connected and disconnected changes taking place within the dyad and propagating 
to the broader network are reinforced by the case study. 
Concerning the effects of fraud in the MAAE, the case study confirms the waste of ad 
budgets and poor results in terms of ROI to be linked to the negative financial impact of fraud 
in the ecosystem and to lead to adjustments to budget allocation strategies depending on an 
intermediary/ publisher’s competence to detect and report fraud – findings that match Daswani 
et al. (2008) and Jain et al. (2010). In addition, the case study reveals that decisions over budget 
allocation are greatly associated to the advertiser’s trust on the intermediary/ publisher and to a 
constant experimentation on new advertising models that reduce fraud and maximize ROI. 
Other effects arise from the research: the damage to intercompany relationships; the damage to 
user experience; the damage to industry’s reputation; and the damage to companies’ efficiency. 
Research on business relationships and interaction has been applied to different business 
settings. This dissertation brings a relevant theoretical contribution by combining the study of 
adaptation processes to a relatively recent business setting: the advertising of and in mobile 
apps. The following aspects are emphasized from the research: the re-mapping of the mobile 
advertising ecosystem with app promotion companies at focus; the fact that, contrary to other 
industries, advertisers and publishers seem to adapt at similar levels, only revealing few 
differences in the processes each adapts the most; the re-classification of the fraud forms that 
most affect the MAAE; and the deepening of the effects of fraud on the ecosystem of 
companies.  
The outcomes of the case study made it clear that the future of the MAAE will lead 
companies to experience profound changes in how they do business, how the supply chain 
works and how higher demands for transparency will change sourcing strategies. In order to 
survive, everyone in the ecosystem will need to actively take part in the fight against ad fraud: 
not only MMPs and fraud specific companies, but advertisers and intermediates, particularly, 
will be forced to improve their practices of safe sourcing new business partners, as a way of 
decreasing the chances of getting defrauded. Companies must adopt safer sourcing practices 
and seek cleaner traffic inventories. A constant and increased investment in fraud measurement 
tools and educational strategies to keep up with fraud’s evolution will be crucial. Overall, the 





great effort made by companies that decide to proactively combat fraud will be compensated 
by upturns in competitive advantage, recognition, spending from advertisers, and higher profits. 
The limitations of this dissertation stem mainly from time constraints. Collecting data from 
multiple companies would have been the ideal sample for this case study; however, limitations 
from the time horizons of the dissertation and limitations from the researcher in reconciling 
academic and professional obligations, made it an unviable path for this research. In addition, 
the difficulty of access to some secondary data and the fact that part of the secondary data used 
had been gathered for different industry settings (business and performance models) must be 
put forward as constraints to this study as well. 
The suggestion of a modified framework of analysis may function as a starting point for 
further empirical work on the effects of mobile fraud on the advertising ecosystem. Further 
research may explore more deeply the ways fraud affects intercompany relationships; 
particularly, how it affects exchange and coordination episodes between advertisers and 
publishers. On the other hand, future work could also take on the proposed model and apply it 
to a wider sample, inquiring a broader set of companies from each group of players of the 
ecosystem and possibly bringing new and richer outcomes of which could be easier to drive 
generalizations from. Lastly, future research would benefit from a longitudinal design, by 
analyzing the development of specific advertiser-publisher relationships and the impact fraud 
episodes represent to the way the relationship changes over time. 
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Briefly describe the business of your company and your current job role.     x x x 
1) Who are the different players within the mobile app advertising industry and how can the 
relationships between them be mapped? 
How do you outline the network of the MAAI? x x x x   x 
Considering it represents a relatively recent business ecosystem, how is the 
MAAI regulated by industry specific authorities? 
x x     x 
In your perspective, what are the major challenges posed by the MAAI? x x x x   x 
How do they impact on the business for enterprises? x x x x   x 
In your perspective, what is the future potential of business in the MAAI? x x x x   x 
Who do you consider to be the main actors/ types of companies within the 
MAAI? 
x x x x   x 
What is the role of advertisers? x x      
And the role of publishers? x x      
What is the role of advertising networks? x x      
What different types of business relationships does your company maintain 
with its stakeholders? 
x x      
Which of these partnerships are the most important, in your perspective? 
Why? 
x x      
And the least important? Why? x x      
What different strategies according to different partnerships is Hang My 
Ads using for relationship management? 
x x x x    
2) How do fraud issues affect the adaptation processes undertaken by publishers (suppliers)? 
When working with an advertiser, what are the major challenges/ struggles 
you face? 
x  x   x  
When starting business, what are the requirements imposed to you by a new 
advertiser? 
x  x   x  
And what requirements do you impose to a new advertiser when starting 
business? 
x  x   x  
Overall, what do you point out as the major concern of an advertiser when 
choosing to do business with you? 
x  x   x  
In your perspective, what is the relevance of the issue of fraud in the MAAI 
in your relationship with an advertiser? 
x  x   x  
Regarding protection against fraud, what is your strategy to transmit 
confidence and credibility to an advertiser? 
x  x   x  
Considering the impact of fraud in the MAAI, what kind of changes/ 
adjustments has your company been doing to its processes to be able to 
adapt and please an advertiser? 
x  x   x  
Considering the different processes of service planning and scheduling, 
information exchange, production process, financial and contractual terms 
and conditions, and organization structure – which ones are subject to 
adaptations when working with different advertisers? 
x  x   x  
Are there any other processes/ business practices that your company 
undertakes in order to protect itself and its advertisers from fraud issues? 
x  x   x  





Think of a specific advertiser your company had to adapt for to respond to 
his fraud concerns – what specific adaptations to your business practices/ 
processes were made to satisfy this advertiser? 
x  x   x  
Please describe the overall context – past and present – of the relationship 
between your company and that advertiser. 
x  x   x  
In the case of relationship termination due to fraud issues, are there any 
chances of future cooperation? If so, under which conditions? 
x  x   x  
How relevant is fraud in the MAAI to Hang My Ads’ business? Why? x x      
What different types of fraud take place in the MAAI? x x     x 
Which of them does your company most commonly deals with? x x     x 
What fraud prevention and defense strategies is Hang My Ads using? x x      
3) How do fraud issues affect the adaptation processes undertaken by advertisers (clients)? 
When working with a publisher, what are the major challenges/ struggles 
you face? 
x   x x   
When starting business, what are the requirements imposed to you by a new 
publisher? 
x   x x   
And what requirements do you impose to a new publisher when starting 
business? 
x   x x   
Overall, what do you point out as the major concern of publisher when 
choosing to do business with you? 
x   x x   
In your perspective, what is the relevance of the issue of fraud in the MAAI 
in your relationship with a publisher? 
x   x x   
Regarding protection against fraud, what is your company’s strategy to 
build its confidence on and prevent fraud from a publisher? 
x   x x   
Considering the impact of fraud in the MAAI, what kind of changes/ 
adjustments has your company been doing to its processes to avoid and deal 
with fraud from a publisher? 
x   x x   
Considering the different processes of service planning and scheduling, 
information exchange, production process, financial and contractual terms 
and conditions, and organization structure – which ones are subject to 
adaptations when working with different publishers? 
x   x x   
Are there any other processes/ business practices that your company 
undertakes in order to protect itself and its publishers from fraud issues? 
x   x x   
Think of a specific publisher that committed fraud when working with your 
company – what specific consequences/ adaptations occurred in your 
company’s relationship with that publisher? 
x   x x   
Please describe the overall context – past and present – of the relationship 
between your company and that publisher. 
x   x x   
In the case of relationship termination due to fraud issues, are there any 
chances of future cooperation? If so, under which conditions? 
x   x x   
How relevant is fraud in the MAAI to Hang My Ads’ business? Why? x x      
What different types of fraud take place in the MAAI? x x     x 
Which of them does your company most commonly deals with? x x     x 
What fraud prevention and defense strategies is Hang My Ads using? x x      
4) What are the main effects of fraud within the mobile app advertising industry? 
How does the issue of fraud in the MAAI affects the overall business of 
your company? 
x x      
What do you estimate to be the monthly revenue loss (%) for your 
company, after fraud claims? 
x x      
In your perspective, what are the main effects of fraud issues in the business 
within the MAAI? 
x x     x 





How much (%) of the global MAAI spend do you estimate to be wasted due 
to fraud issues? 
      x 
How do fraud issues affect the ROI for advertisers?       x 
What are the effects of fraud issues in the planning and allocation of 
advertising budgets? 
x x x x x x  
How do you see the MAAI changing in the coming years due to fraud 
issues? 
x x x x x x x 
What industry players do you believe will have the greater impact on the 
fight against mobile ad fraud? 
x x x x x x x 
In your perspective, what would be needed to end or, at least, drastically 
reduce fraud issues in the MAAI? 
      x 
What measures should companies, in your opinion, adopt to protect 
themselves against fraud issues in the MAAI? 
      x 
How many companies (%) in the MAAI do you estimate to be putting those 
measures in practice? 
      x 

















Fraud Definition Source 
VPN 
Fraud 
A VPN (virtual private network) – or proxy – uses encryption for 
internet connection allowing different IP addresses to be simulated and 
making it impossible for tracking systems to attain users’ real location. 
Although not usually considered illegal, device farms often use VPNs to 









Duplicate IP detection is flagged when conversions from the same offer 





IP pattern fraud is flagged when conversions from the same offer score 
high in IP address similarity, usually associated with the fraudsters 
resetting their IP address to artificially increase the volume of 





Bots are one of the most widespread fraud mechanisms and can take 
either of two forms: a bot that is run off of servers, attempting to 
simulate specific user behavior, such as ad clicks, app installs and in-app 
engagement; or a device-based malware, attempting to simulate ad 
impressions, clicks and in-app engagement. Fraud originating from bots 







SDK spoofing is another form of device-based bot tactic, where open 









Click flooding (also known as click spamming) hijacks organic 
conversions by overloading the attribution system with an abnormally 
high volume of clicks – part of them matched to organic traffic and 
attributed as legitimate. Click flooding represents installs from real users 








Install hijacking (also known as click injection), in turn, uses malware on 
devices (often hidden in apparently legitimate apps) to identify the 
moment an organic install begins and to send false click reports during 
the install process to claim its attribution. Install hijacking represents 








New devices fraud is flagged whenever devices used for promotion have 
not yet been recorded with a significant amount of activity on 
DeviceRank™ – the world’s largest anti-fraud database and the only 
platform with enough scope to effectively identify device ID reset fraud 
behaviors. Device ID reset fraud consists of fraudsters clicking on real 
ads, installing and engaging with the actual apps before resetting their 
device IDs in-between each install, effectively generating significant 





Table 2: Fraud forms. 
 
 
